Iqbal Aur German Falsafa

Every philosopher possesses a distinct philosophical system in which sensibilities, categories, and concepts are formulated according to the internal demands of that specific system. Consequently, categories, concepts, and ideas carry different meanings across various philosophies, and understanding the precise manner in which they are employed is no easy task. Furthermore, one cannot accurately distinguish or differentiate between the works of various philosophers without first grasping the distinct and differential roles these categories and concepts play, thereby penetrating both the surface and the essence of their philosophies. Mere superficial similarities do not warrant speculative conclusions. The edifice of any philosophy is erected upon specific propositions or their unique arrangements. It is exceedingly difficult to comprehend a philosopher's entire system merely by reading a single book of theirs. A great philosopher views the established foundations of preceding philosophies with skepticism. They identify and deconstruct logical flaws and contradictions within them, or reveal further contradictions within those already deconstructed. They do this precisely to safeguard themselves against logical fallacies that would otherwise inevitably arise. In certain philosophies, specific terminology plays a highly specialized role; recognizing this is crucial to avoiding misinterpretation. In the Western world, no philosophy has ever emerged that is considered beyond doubt or scrutiny. It is an intellectual paralysis unique to our society that individuals who merely revolve around a single, fixed orbit are accepted as absolute authorities on philosophy, and their words are treated as the final verdict. A great philosopher formulates a specific methodology. By applying this method, the true nature of an object, reality, existence, and thought can be better understood. Such philosophies fundamentally alter our perspective of the world, and it is precisely these philosophers who attract the most extensive criticism.

In modern philosophy, Immanuel Kant ranks among these monumental figures who completely transformed the currents of philosophical thought and the broader worldview in the West. In the eighteenth century, when British Empiricism and German Rationalism had reached a dead end due to their ultimate conclusions, it was Kant who critiqued these two divergent philosophical traditions and termed his own approach Critical Philosophy. Kant’s magnum opus, *Critique of Pure Reason*, is counted among the few truly great books in the history of philosophy. First published in 1781, the ideas presented within it clearly demonstrate this great philosopher's profound capacity to peer into the future. In 1781, Kant dethroned God and placed humanity at the center. Monarchy, which was considered the earthly substitute for God in Europe, was subsequently dismantled by French revolutionaries exactly eight years later, in 1789. The conceptual seeds for the dismantling of feudalism and Christian theology in Europe are all present within the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The crux of Kant’s philosophy is that it is not God who determines what humanity should be; rather, it is humanity that determines the nature of God through rational, logical, and dialectical analysis. To place humanity at the center, it is imperative to decentralize God; it is impossible for both to occupy the center simultaneously. Humanity does not annihilate God, but rather ceases to allow divine interference in human affairs, no longer using God to dictate its own epistemological, moral, and social values. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, following a rigorous rational, logical, and dialectical inquiry, the concept of freedom emerges as an inevitable conclusion. Freedom is a universal concept; without it, morality cannot even be defined. It is within this universal concept of freedom that the idea of human equality is inherently embedded. In his *Science of Logic*, Hegel writes that the great philosopher who laid the foundation for the dialectical method in modern philosophy was Immanuel Kant. We must bear in mind that it was Kant who provided not only the philosophical justification for the supremacy of reason, but also the rational and logical justification for human centrality, thereby permanently eliminating the role of religion in state affairs. Napoleon once ordered that a summary of Kant’s philosophy be presented to him. Upon hearing it, he labeled Kant cunning and struck his name from his list of favored individuals. The reason was that, in that era, revolutionary elements were prominently visible in Kant's philosophy. Even today, the foundations of contemporary Europe can easily be traced back to Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Kant is a philosopher whose work continues to be interpreted and understood across the globe to this day. In the twentieth century, great philosophers such as Martin Heidegger, Theodor Adorno, Jean-Paul Sartre, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Jacques Derrida wrote numerous books on Kant's philosophy. In doing so, they challenged the Kantian interpretations of major philosophers, including Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Marx. The Western world has also produced prominent commentators like Norman Kemp Smith, Paul Guyer, Robert Pippin, Sebastian Gardner, and Henry Allison, who have dedicated their entire lives to interpreting Kant. They have authored not just one or two, but dozens of books on him. This ongoing tradition of research into Kantian philosophy shows no signs of stopping. In our society, however, there is not a single genuine Kant scholar, yet every other person claims to be an expert on Iqbal. Not only Kant, but the entirety of Western philosophy is viewed exclusively through the lens of Iqbal. We have adopted the assumption that whatever Iqbal has said regarding Western philosophy, if not divine revelation, holds at least the unquestionable status of a Hadith. Consequently, ignorance and conservatism continue to deepen their roots within our society. Those who have studied philosophy directly know that Iqbal was not a philosopher. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* is not a philosophical treatise; it merely consists of Iqbal's commentary on philosophy. Within this commentary, several ideas are presented that can easily be challenged and refuted.

In his very first lecture, Iqbal endorses Kant’s assertion that access to absolute reality is beyond the grasp of pure reason. In his seventh lecture, he writes, We all know that Kant was the first to raise the question: Is metaphysics possible? He answered it in the negative. A deeper analysis reveals that both of these excerpts reflect Iqbal’s own desires regarding Kant rather than the actual reality of Kant’s philosophy. Kant only challenges the metaphysics associated with mystical thought and the pre-Kantian rationalist philosophical tradition. In contrast, he demonstrates that metaphysics is possible within the realm of experience. Iqbal made no attempt to trace the distinct and differential role of reason across epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics, nor did he try to understand the dialectical role of negation in the Kantian method. Kant states, The critique of pure theoretical reason consists of an attempt to transform the methodology that has hitherto prevailed in metaphysics. In other words, metaphysics should be realized through practical reason or ethics, rather than theoretical reason. Kant merely negates the previous methodology; he does not abolish metaphysics, nor does he believe that metaphysics is impossible. Kant’s magnum opus, *Critique of Pure Reason*, investigates the empirical and transcendental functions of reason. Where this book ends, his second book, *Critique of Practical Reason*, begins. Kant’s philosophical project is ultimately completed in his third critique. Reading the second book reveals that in Kant’s philosophical method, the true role of the category of negation is dialectical in nature. Kantian negation can never be understood in a traditional metaphysical sense, where a thing either exists or does not exist. In Kantian philosophy, the affirmative role of practical reason begins only after this negation, and it is subsequently validated by theoretical reason. The very metaphysics that Kant negates is also the one he preserves. Thus, through the affirmative role of theoretical reason, what Kant terms a practical-dogmatic metaphysics is formulated.

To understand any philosopher's work as a cohesive whole, comprehending their philosophical method is indispensable. Iqbal failed to recognize the theoretical and practical applications of reason simply because he was solely seeking validation for his own theological perspective—a theology he never felt the need to analyze philosophically. Consequently, his desires took precedence over rational argument. Iqbal was unable to identify the distinct and differential roles of reason in epistemology and ethics, nor could he perceive the process through which metaphysics is reconstructed in the subsequent stage.

To understand the theoretical use of reason, it is necessary to briefly discuss empiricism and rationalism, both of which Kant critiqued. The essence of empiricism is that it denies the active role of reason, restricting knowledge entirely to sensory perception. Conversely, the rationalist tradition dismisses the active role of the senses, assigning reason the task of directly comprehending the thing-in-itself. Kant highlights the distinctions and contradictions among human faculties—namely, sensibility, understanding, and reason. Sensibility is incapable of accessing the thing-in-itself, nor can it comprehend the absolute existence inherent within it. The raw data that sensibility transmits to the understanding does not relate to the absolute essence of the thing-in-itself, but merely to phenomena. Thus, Kant draws a clear dividing line between phenomenon and essence. The inevitable result is that pure understanding, rather than reaching the absolute existence within the thing-in-itself, remains confined to sensory objects. Categories exist *a priori* within the understanding; they merely seek to synthesize the objects perceived through sensibility, and through thought, these concepts are applied to sensory objects. In this way, no purely theoretical use of reason remains. Kant was well aware of this reality. One of his major achievements was that, in determining the limits of reason, he did not resort to any non-rational or so-called intuitive faculties. By using reason to set the limits of reason, Kant establishes himself as a rationalist, firmly connecting him to the German rationalist tradition. At the same time, by linking the categories and concepts of pure understanding to sensibility, he aligns himself closely with empiricism. One of his greatest contributions is the restoration of the dialectical method within modern philosophical discourse.

It is crucial to keep one point in mind here: the limited role of reason in epistemology and metaphysics could only be highlighted because reason is incapable of resolving the contradictions between phenomenon and essence, and subsequently between sensibility and understanding. Therefore, the role of reason is limited by the concept of contradiction. However, it would be wrong to conclude from this that Kant does not apply the metaphysical concepts of pure understanding to experience. Kant merely limits their role regarding the acquisition of knowledge beyond experience; he still makes it mandatory to apply these metaphysical concepts to sensory perceptions. This is its primary application. Its secondary application is that reason establishes the concepts of God, the soul, and the will without sensory perception, linking them instead to moral action. I will elaborate on this later. For now, bear in mind that when the concepts of pure understanding are severed from sensibility, they can still be conceived, but knowing them does not add to our actual knowledge. To expand our knowledge, we require sensory perception derived from the phenomenon. At this juncture, Kant can be criticized for deeming the object received through sensibility as essential for acquiring knowledge. It is this very object that exposes the contradiction between reason and understanding. Now, if the object received through sensibility is deemed mandatory, reason inevitably becomes entangled in contradictions. This is why, in his practical critique, Kant does not use reason to acquire knowledge of the categories of pure understanding; rather, he uses it merely to conceive them. It is another of Kant's great achievements to have logically and rationally proven that our senses are the sole means of acquiring knowledge. A reality beyond the senses can be conceived, but it cannot be known. When Kant states that certain concepts beyond the senses can be contemplated, he is, in fact, affirming metaphysics. Furthermore, the application of these concepts to human empirical life implies that Kant has given metaphysics a concrete form. Hegel asserts that the transcendental inquiry of reason is Kant's greatest contribution. The restoration of transcendentalism was solely intended to break free from sensibility, thereby negating empiricism. The German philosopher adopted Kant's subjective transcendental method, arguing that sensibility could be completely dismantled through the process of negation. It should be clear, therefore, that after Kant, Fichte was the philosopher who deeply investigated transcendentalism and further developed Kantian metaphysics, which was taking shape through dialectical negation. Hegel adopted this very method, claiming that metaphysics could be constructed through a dialectical process using pure reason, without becoming entangled in sensibility. Hegel articulates this in his *Science of Logic*.

Iqbal was only familiar with those propositions of Kant's philosophy that limit the theoretical dimension of Kantian metaphysics. However, the purpose of restricting this theoretical dimension of reason was to shut the door on the rational theology represented by figures like Leibniz and Wolff. When Iqbal asserts that the situation for rational theology was not as dire as Kant perceived it to be, he not only completely ignores Kant's critique of Wolff and Leibniz but also proves himself entirely oblivious to the broader discourse on practical reason. At this juncture, Iqbal ought to have provided a rebuttal to Kant's logical objections against the rational theology that had already been established in Germany. However, Iqbal did no such thing. It must be clarified here that Kant negated the specific metaphysics that had already been constructed within German philosophy. In contrast to it, Kant formulated his own metaphysics. The negation of merely one metaphysical concept cannot be equated with the negation of metaphysics in its entirety. Nor can one establish a superficial understanding of this negation, as Iqbal has done.

Iqbal writes, Due to Kant's theory of the real thing and the phenomenon, the question of the possibility of his metaphysics becomes severely limited. It is necessary to point out here that it is not the thing-in-itself and the phenomenon per se, but rather the definitive distinction between them, that restricts metaphysics to theoretical reason. Interestingly, Iqbal accepts the conclusion drawn from the limited use of theoretical reason based on this very distinction—meaning that if there were another level of experience, Kant would be correct! It is crucial to remember this highly important point: the proposition regarding the limitation of metaphysics arises solely through reason within the realm of theoretical reason. Kant wanted to establish metaphysics as a systematic science. A science that is not subordinate to any intuitive activity, but rather free from all logical and rational irregularities. In the preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and in its final chapter, the theoretical and practical applications of reason are elucidated with profound subtlety. As for Iqbal, he was remarkably quick to draw erroneous conclusions, yet he made no attempt whatsoever to bridge the gap between the Kantian categories of the thing-in-itself and the phenomenon. Nor did he provide any evidence of comprehending the active role of metaphysics under practical reason.

By establishing the philosophical foundation for the practical use of reason, the affirmative role of metaphysics also becomes evident. Kant himself describes this in the following manner: When it becomes clear to us that theoretical reason is incapable of acquiring knowledge of a world beyond the senses, our attention should then be directed toward acquiring the practical knowledge of reason. In this way, by transcending the limits of possible experience, the undetermined transcendental concept can be determined as the ultimate result of metaphysics. (p. 17) In the history of philosophy, this was the very methodology regarding metaphysics that Kant formulated, completely transforming the traditional metaphysical approach. Kant feared that a superficial reading of his book might lead to the conclusion that there is no positive use for reason or metaphysics. He clearly sensed this and formally expressed it in these words: A cursory reading of this book will lead to the conclusion that its use is only negative, namely, that it prevents theoretical reason from stepping outside the bounds of experience. This is indeed its primary use, but this use immediately becomes positive when we understand that the principles by which theoretical reason seeks to extend beyond the limits of experience inevitably result not in the expansion of reason's boundaries, but in their restriction... Insofar as the critique limits the use of theoretical reason, it is negative; but as soon as it removes the obstacle that threatens to destroy the use of practical reason, it possesses a positive and highly significant use. (pp. 18-19) Until one understands the Kantian method, Kantian metaphysics cannot be understood either. Iqbal's misunderstanding regarding Kant's metaphysics arose simply because Iqbal assumed the category of negation in the *Critique of Pure Reason* to be final. In modern Western philosophy, Spinoza was the first philosopher to state that the first determination is through negation. This category of negation is an essential component of Kantian epistemology. Reason's act of negating metaphysics is also an act of self-negation, simply so that in the next stage, it can restore not only itself but also metaphysics. Since Kantian metaphysics is subordinate to its dialectics, its metaphysics cannot be understood without first understanding its dialectics.

It should be clear that reason removes the obstacles in its own path; it does not bow down in submission to any other power by considering it superior to itself. In logical and rational debates, searching for a truth beyond reason through intuition is an irrational and illogical act. In the contemporary era, encouraging such a methodology is tantamount to taking refuge in antiquity. In Kantian metaphysics, this limitation of reason is merely one stage of his entire philosophical project, which he overcomes in the final chapter of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Is it acceptable in philosophical debates to base one's stance on only half of a philosopher's argument? Instead of grasping the fundamental idea of Kant's philosophy, he [Iqbal] drew such premature conclusions about Kant that he not only misled himself but also pushed his readers into the same delusion.

A little further on, he presents Ibn Arabi's argument: It is possible that what we call the external world is merely a mental construct, and that there are other levels of human experience related to a different level of space and time. Reflecting on the nature of this sentence reveals that Iqbal himself is hesitant to say anything with certainty about the conclusion he is drawing. Notice here that the use of It is possible exposes his own skepticism. How can one challenge another's philosophy based on something about which one is not even certain? Such attitudes are unacceptable in academic debates. These attitudes may hold poetic value, but they possess no philosophical significance. In rational philosophies, such an illogical methodology cannot be viewed with esteem. In this way, one could create the possibility for anything, even that which negates one's own arguments. An objection can be raised here: Did Iqbal actually experience such a world? If he had gone through this experience, why did he not impart the knowledge of that experience? He should have written a treatise on the knowledge pertaining to a different level of space and time. Then the question arises: how would the truth of this knowledge be committed to writing? Would it require a logical methodology? If a logical methodology were adopted, the validity of that methodology would also have to be tested under a logical framework. This is an idea that modern Western philosophy completely rejects. The entire evolution of modern Western societies rests upon the demolition of this very orthodox idea that Iqbal attempted to revive, and it is this very idea that excludes Iqbal from modern philosophy, dragging him into the unfathomable depths of antiquity. In the debates of the final decades of the twentieth century, this idea was once again annihilated. Jacques Derrida, while presenting a critique of Edmund Husserl's mystical thoughts in his book *Speech and Phenomena*, invalidated all forms of transcendentalism on profoundly deep logical grounds based on linguistics.

What remains to be seen is whether Kant subscribes to any philosophy that allows for the possibility of an experience other than sensory experience. However, Iqbal's illogical assertion can neither be compared to the rational and logical formulation of Kantian thought, nor can it refute Kantian arguments. Kant's *noumena*, which consisted of the categories of pure understanding, was accepted by reason as a concept simply because the will to uphold moral principles must be autonomous. This concept can be thought of, but it cannot be known through pure reason. Therefore, if this level is termed the internal level of Kantian epistemology, in which a series of concepts exists *a priori*, then Iqbal's argument cannot be applied to Kant. In the preface to his second Critique, Kant clearly writes that the phenomenon which can be conceived intuitively finds its complete verification in practical reason. Kant's flaw was that he established an absolute dichotomy between the internal and the external, of which he was aware; the resolution of this dichotomy is the central premise of his second and third Critiques.

Iqbal failed to understand the function of practical reason in relation to metaphysics. In contrast to external experience, pure understanding was precisely the kind of internal experience where, after revealing the limited role of theoretical reason, the role of practical reason had to be expanded. Here, it is important to bear in mind once again that in its quest for metaphysics, reason negates itself, which consequently negates metaphysics. Yet, in the very next moment, where it affirms metaphysics, it also affirms itself. The formation of its practical role occurs under rational guidance, which becomes entirely disconnected from the objects received through external experience. Completely severed from external phenomena, reason reflects upon itself to gauge its own power: can reason, without sensory perception, outline those transcendental concepts whose practical application might be possible? Kant succeeds in this endeavor, but he is unable to eliminate the duality that exists between theoretical and practical reason.

In theoretical reason, the Absolute remains undetermined because it exists beyond the senses; however, theoretical reason confirms its Absolute nature as a necessary concept. This was the very spirit of theology, under which man was to be empowered as a moral being. To establish a relationship between morality and concepts such as God, the soul, and the will, it was necessary to limit the role of epistemological metaphysics. However, it must also be clarified here that in the preface to the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant does not consider concepts like God and immortality to be the conditions of morality. Instead, he regards them as the conditions for the object of the will, which is determined by the moral law. This is the concept of human centrality that forms the foundation of modern critical philosophy. According to this, man alone is responsible for his own actions.

Every philosopher possesses a distinct philosophical system in which sensibilities, categories, and concepts are formulated according to the internal demands of that specific system. Consequently, categories, concepts, and ideas carry different meanings across various philosophies, and understanding the precise manner in which they are employed is no easy task. Furthermore, one cannot accurately distinguish or differentiate between the works of various philosophers without first grasping the distinct and differential roles these categories and concepts play, thereby penetrating both the surface and the essence of their philosophies. Mere superficial similarities do not warrant speculative conclusions. The edifice of any philosophy is erected upon specific propositions or their unique arrangements. It is exceedingly difficult to comprehend a philosopher's entire system merely by reading a single book of theirs. A great philosopher views the established foundations of preceding philosophies with skepticism. They identify and deconstruct logical flaws and contradictions within them, or reveal further contradictions within those already deconstructed. They do this precisely to safeguard themselves against logical fallacies that would otherwise inevitably arise. In certain philosophies, specific terminology plays a highly specialized role; recognizing this is crucial to avoiding misinterpretation. In the Western world, no philosophy has ever emerged that is considered beyond doubt or scrutiny. It is an intellectual paralysis unique to our society that individuals who merely revolve around a single, fixed orbit are accepted as absolute authorities on philosophy, and their words are treated as the final verdict. A great philosopher formulates a specific methodology. By applying this method, the true nature of an object, reality, existence, and thought can be better understood. Such philosophies fundamentally alter our perspective of the world, and it is precisely these philosophers who attract the most extensive criticism.

In modern philosophy, Immanuel Kant ranks among these monumental figures who completely transformed the currents of philosophical thought and the broader worldview in the West. In the eighteenth century, when British Empiricism and German Rationalism had reached a dead end due to their ultimate conclusions, it was Kant who critiqued these two divergent philosophical traditions and termed his own approach Critical Philosophy. Kant’s magnum opus, *Critique of Pure Reason*, is counted among the few truly great books in the history of philosophy. First published in 1781, the ideas presented within it clearly demonstrate this great philosopher's profound capacity to peer into the future. In 1781, Kant dethroned God and placed humanity at the center. Monarchy, which was considered the earthly substitute for God in Europe, was subsequently dismantled by French revolutionaries exactly eight years later, in 1789. The conceptual seeds for the dismantling of feudalism and Christian theology in Europe are all present within the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The crux of Kant’s philosophy is that it is not God who determines what humanity should be; rather, it is humanity that determines the nature of God through rational, logical, and dialectical analysis. To place humanity at the center, it is imperative to decentralize God; it is impossible for both to occupy the center simultaneously. Humanity does not annihilate God, but rather ceases to allow divine interference in human affairs, no longer using God to dictate its own epistemological, moral, and social values. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, following a rigorous rational, logical, and dialectical inquiry, the concept of freedom emerges as an inevitable conclusion. Freedom is a universal concept; without it, morality cannot even be defined. It is within this universal concept of freedom that the idea of human equality is inherently embedded. In his *Science of Logic*, Hegel writes that the great philosopher who laid the foundation for the dialectical method in modern philosophy was Immanuel Kant. We must bear in mind that it was Kant who provided not only the philosophical justification for the supremacy of reason, but also the rational and logical justification for human centrality, thereby permanently eliminating the role of religion in state affairs. Napoleon once ordered that a summary of Kant’s philosophy be presented to him. Upon hearing it, he labeled Kant cunning and struck his name from his list of favored individuals. The reason was that, in that era, revolutionary elements were prominently visible in Kant's philosophy. Even today, the foundations of contemporary Europe can easily be traced back to Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Kant is a philosopher whose work continues to be interpreted and understood across the globe to this day. In the twentieth century, great philosophers such as Martin Heidegger, Theodor Adorno, Jean-Paul Sartre, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Jacques Derrida wrote numerous books on Kant's philosophy. In doing so, they challenged the Kantian interpretations of major philosophers, including Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Marx. The Western world has also produced prominent commentators like Norman Kemp Smith, Paul Guyer, Robert Pippin, Sebastian Gardner, and Henry Allison, who have dedicated their entire lives to interpreting Kant. They have authored not just one or two, but dozens of books on him. This ongoing tradition of research into Kantian philosophy shows no signs of stopping. In our society, however, there is not a single genuine Kant scholar, yet every other person claims to be an expert on Iqbal. Not only Kant, but the entirety of Western philosophy is viewed exclusively through the lens of Iqbal. We have adopted the assumption that whatever Iqbal has said regarding Western philosophy, if not divine revelation, holds at least the unquestionable status of a Hadith. Consequently, ignorance and conservatism continue to deepen their roots within our society. Those who have studied philosophy directly know that Iqbal was not a philosopher. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* is not a philosophical treatise; it merely consists of Iqbal's commentary on philosophy. Within this commentary, several ideas are presented that can easily be challenged and refuted.

In his very first lecture, Iqbal endorses Kant’s assertion that access to absolute reality is beyond the grasp of pure reason. In his seventh lecture, he writes, We all know that Kant was the first to raise the question: Is metaphysics possible? He answered it in the negative. A deeper analysis reveals that both of these excerpts reflect Iqbal’s own desires regarding Kant rather than the actual reality of Kant’s philosophy. Kant only challenges the metaphysics associated with mystical thought and the pre-Kantian rationalist philosophical tradition. In contrast, he demonstrates that metaphysics is possible within the realm of experience. Iqbal made no attempt to trace the distinct and differential role of reason across epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics, nor did he try to understand the dialectical role of negation in the Kantian method. Kant states, The critique of pure theoretical reason consists of an attempt to transform the methodology that has hitherto prevailed in metaphysics. In other words, metaphysics should be realized through practical reason or ethics, rather than theoretical reason. Kant merely negates the previous methodology; he does not abolish metaphysics, nor does he believe that metaphysics is impossible. Kant’s magnum opus, *Critique of Pure Reason*, investigates the empirical and transcendental functions of reason. Where this book ends, his second book, *Critique of Practical Reason*, begins. Kant’s philosophical project is ultimately completed in his third critique. Reading the second book reveals that in Kant’s philosophical method, the true role of the category of negation is dialectical in nature. Kantian negation can never be understood in a traditional metaphysical sense, where a thing either exists or does not exist. In Kantian philosophy, the affirmative role of practical reason begins only after this negation, and it is subsequently validated by theoretical reason. The very metaphysics that Kant negates is also the one he preserves. Thus, through the affirmative role of theoretical reason, what Kant terms a practical-dogmatic metaphysics is formulated.

To understand any philosopher's work as a cohesive whole, comprehending their philosophical method is indispensable. Iqbal failed to recognize the theoretical and practical applications of reason simply because he was solely seeking validation for his own theological perspective—a theology he never felt the need to analyze philosophically. Consequently, his desires took precedence over rational argument. Iqbal was unable to identify the distinct and differential roles of reason in epistemology and ethics, nor could he perceive the process through which metaphysics is reconstructed in the subsequent stage.

To understand the theoretical use of reason, it is necessary to briefly discuss empiricism and rationalism, both of which Kant critiqued. The essence of empiricism is that it denies the active role of reason, restricting knowledge entirely to sensory perception. Conversely, the rationalist tradition dismisses the active role of the senses, assigning reason the task of directly comprehending the thing-in-itself. Kant highlights the distinctions and contradictions among human faculties—namely, sensibility, understanding, and reason. Sensibility is incapable of accessing the thing-in-itself, nor can it comprehend the absolute existence inherent within it. The raw data that sensibility transmits to the understanding does not relate to the absolute essence of the thing-in-itself, but merely to phenomena. Thus, Kant draws a clear dividing line between phenomenon and essence. The inevitable result is that pure understanding, rather than reaching the absolute existence within the thing-in-itself, remains confined to sensory objects. Categories exist *a priori* within the understanding; they merely seek to synthesize the objects perceived through sensibility, and through thought, these concepts are applied to sensory objects. In this way, no purely theoretical use of reason remains. Kant was well aware of this reality. One of his major achievements was that, in determining the limits of reason, he did not resort to any non-rational or so-called intuitive faculties. By using reason to set the limits of reason, Kant establishes himself as a rationalist, firmly connecting him to the German rationalist tradition. At the same time, by linking the categories and concepts of pure understanding to sensibility, he aligns himself closely with empiricism. One of his greatest contributions is the restoration of the dialectical method within modern philosophical discourse.

It is crucial to keep one point in mind here: the limited role of reason in epistemology and metaphysics could only be highlighted because reason is incapable of resolving the contradictions between phenomenon and essence, and subsequently between sensibility and understanding. Therefore, the role of reason is limited by the concept of contradiction. However, it would be wrong to conclude from this that Kant does not apply the metaphysical concepts of pure understanding to experience. Kant merely limits their role regarding the acquisition of knowledge beyond experience; he still makes it mandatory to apply these metaphysical concepts to sensory perceptions. This is its primary application. Its secondary application is that reason establishes the concepts of God, the soul, and the will without sensory perception, linking them instead to moral action. I will elaborate on this later. For now, bear in mind that when the concepts of pure understanding are severed from sensibility, they can still be conceived, but knowing them does not add to our actual knowledge. To expand our knowledge, we require sensory perception derived from the phenomenon. At this juncture, Kant can be criticized for deeming the object received through sensibility as essential for acquiring knowledge. It is this very object that exposes the contradiction between reason and understanding. Now, if the object received through sensibility is deemed mandatory, reason inevitably becomes entangled in contradictions. This is why, in his practical critique, Kant does not use reason to acquire knowledge of the categories of pure understanding; rather, he uses it merely to conceive them. It is another of Kant's great achievements to have logically and rationally proven that our senses are the sole means of acquiring knowledge. A reality beyond the senses can be conceived, but it cannot be known. When Kant states that certain concepts beyond the senses can be contemplated, he is, in fact, affirming metaphysics. Furthermore, the application of these concepts to human empirical life implies that Kant has given metaphysics a concrete form. Hegel asserts that the transcendental inquiry of reason is Kant's greatest contribution. The restoration of transcendentalism was solely intended to break free from sensibility, thereby negating empiricism. The German philosopher adopted Kant's subjective transcendental method, arguing that sensibility could be completely dismantled through the process of negation. It should be clear, therefore, that after Kant, Fichte was the philosopher who deeply investigated transcendentalism and further developed Kantian metaphysics, which was taking shape through dialectical negation. Hegel adopted this very method, claiming that metaphysics could be constructed through a dialectical process using pure reason, without becoming entangled in sensibility. Hegel articulates this in his *Science of Logic*.

Iqbal was only familiar with those propositions of Kant's philosophy that limit the theoretical dimension of Kantian metaphysics. However, the purpose of restricting this theoretical dimension of reason was to shut the door on the rational theology represented by figures like Leibniz and Wolff. When Iqbal asserts that the situation for rational theology was not as dire as Kant perceived it to be, he not only completely ignores Kant's critique of Wolff and Leibniz but also proves himself entirely oblivious to the broader discourse on practical reason. At this juncture, Iqbal ought to have provided a rebuttal to Kant's logical objections against the rational theology that had already been established in Germany. However, Iqbal did no such thing. It must be clarified here that Kant negated the specific metaphysics that had already been constructed within German philosophy. In contrast to it, Kant formulated his own metaphysics. The negation of merely one metaphysical concept cannot be equated with the negation of metaphysics in its entirety. Nor can one establish a superficial understanding of this negation, as Iqbal has done.

Iqbal writes, Due to Kant's theory of the real thing and the phenomenon, the question of the possibility of his metaphysics becomes severely limited. It is necessary to point out here that it is not the thing-in-itself and the phenomenon per se, but rather the definitive distinction between them, that restricts metaphysics to theoretical reason. Interestingly, Iqbal accepts the conclusion drawn from the limited use of theoretical reason based on this very distinction—meaning that if there were another level of experience, Kant would be correct! It is crucial to remember this highly important point: the proposition regarding the limitation of metaphysics arises solely through reason within the realm of theoretical reason. Kant wanted to establish metaphysics as a systematic science. A science that is not subordinate to any intuitive activity, but rather free from all logical and rational irregularities. In the preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and in its final chapter, the theoretical and practical applications of reason are elucidated with profound subtlety. As for Iqbal, he was remarkably quick to draw erroneous conclusions, yet he made no attempt whatsoever to bridge the gap between the Kantian categories of the thing-in-itself and the phenomenon. Nor did he provide any evidence of comprehending the active role of metaphysics under practical reason.

By establishing the philosophical foundation for the practical use of reason, the affirmative role of metaphysics also becomes evident. Kant himself describes this in the following manner: When it becomes clear to us that theoretical reason is incapable of acquiring knowledge of a world beyond the senses, our attention should then be directed toward acquiring the practical knowledge of reason. In this way, by transcending the limits of possible experience, the undetermined transcendental concept can be determined as the ultimate result of metaphysics. (p. 17) In the history of philosophy, this was the very methodology regarding metaphysics that Kant formulated, completely transforming the traditional metaphysical approach. Kant feared that a superficial reading of his book might lead to the conclusion that there is no positive use for reason or metaphysics. He clearly sensed this and formally expressed it in these words: A cursory reading of this book will lead to the conclusion that its use is only negative, namely, that it prevents theoretical reason from stepping outside the bounds of experience. This is indeed its primary use, but this use immediately becomes positive when we understand that the principles by which theoretical reason seeks to extend beyond the limits of experience inevitably result not in the expansion of reason's boundaries, but in their restriction... Insofar as the critique limits the use of theoretical reason, it is negative; but as soon as it removes the obstacle that threatens to destroy the use of practical reason, it possesses a positive and highly significant use. (pp. 18-19) Until one understands the Kantian method, Kantian metaphysics cannot be understood either. Iqbal's misunderstanding regarding Kant's metaphysics arose simply because Iqbal assumed the category of negation in the *Critique of Pure Reason* to be final. In modern Western philosophy, Spinoza was the first philosopher to state that the first determination is through negation. This category of negation is an essential component of Kantian epistemology. Reason's act of negating metaphysics is also an act of self-negation, simply so that in the next stage, it can restore not only itself but also metaphysics. Since Kantian metaphysics is subordinate to its dialectics, its metaphysics cannot be understood without first understanding its dialectics.

It should be clear that reason removes the obstacles in its own path; it does not bow down in submission to any other power by considering it superior to itself. In logical and rational debates, searching for a truth beyond reason through intuition is an irrational and illogical act. In the contemporary era, encouraging such a methodology is tantamount to taking refuge in antiquity. In Kantian metaphysics, this limitation of reason is merely one stage of his entire philosophical project, which he overcomes in the final chapter of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Is it acceptable in philosophical debates to base one's stance on only half of a philosopher's argument? Instead of grasping the fundamental idea of Kant's philosophy, he [Iqbal] drew such premature conclusions about Kant that he not only misled himself but also pushed his readers into the same delusion.

A little further on, he presents Ibn Arabi's argument: It is possible that what we call the external world is merely a mental construct, and that there are other levels of human experience related to a different level of space and time. Reflecting on the nature of this sentence reveals that Iqbal himself is hesitant to say anything with certainty about the conclusion he is drawing. Notice here that the use of It is possible exposes his own skepticism. How can one challenge another's philosophy based on something about which one is not even certain? Such attitudes are unacceptable in academic debates. These attitudes may hold poetic value, but they possess no philosophical significance. In rational philosophies, such an illogical methodology cannot be viewed with esteem. In this way, one could create the possibility for anything, even that which negates one's own arguments. An objection can be raised here: Did Iqbal actually experience such a world? If he had gone through this experience, why did he not impart the knowledge of that experience? He should have written a treatise on the knowledge pertaining to a different level of space and time. Then the question arises: how would the truth of this knowledge be committed to writing? Would it require a logical methodology? If a logical methodology were adopted, the validity of that methodology would also have to be tested under a logical framework. This is an idea that modern Western philosophy completely rejects. The entire evolution of modern Western societies rests upon the demolition of this very orthodox idea that Iqbal attempted to revive, and it is this very idea that excludes Iqbal from modern philosophy, dragging him into the unfathomable depths of antiquity. In the debates of the final decades of the twentieth century, this idea was once again annihilated. Jacques Derrida, while presenting a critique of Edmund Husserl's mystical thoughts in his book *Speech and Phenomena*, invalidated all forms of transcendentalism on profoundly deep logical grounds based on linguistics.

What remains to be seen is whether Kant subscribes to any philosophy that allows for the possibility of an experience other than sensory experience. However, Iqbal's illogical assertion can neither be compared to the rational and logical formulation of Kantian thought, nor can it refute Kantian arguments. Kant's *noumena*, which consisted of the categories of pure understanding, was accepted by reason as a concept simply because the will to uphold moral principles must be autonomous. This concept can be thought of, but it cannot be known through pure reason. Therefore, if this level is termed the internal level of Kantian epistemology, in which a series of concepts exists *a priori*, then Iqbal's argument cannot be applied to Kant. In the preface to his second Critique, Kant clearly writes that the phenomenon which can be conceived intuitively finds its complete verification in practical reason. Kant's flaw was that he established an absolute dichotomy between the internal and the external, of which he was aware; the resolution of this dichotomy is the central premise of his second and third Critiques.

Iqbal failed to understand the function of practical reason in relation to metaphysics. In contrast to external experience, pure understanding was precisely the kind of internal experience where, after revealing the limited role of theoretical reason, the role of practical reason had to be expanded. Here, it is important to bear in mind once again that in its quest for metaphysics, reason negates itself, which consequently negates metaphysics. Yet, in the very next moment, where it affirms metaphysics, it also affirms itself. The formation of its practical role occurs under rational guidance, which becomes entirely disconnected from the objects received through external experience. Completely severed from external phenomena, reason reflects upon itself to gauge its own power: can reason, without sensory perception, outline those transcendental concepts whose practical application might be possible? Kant succeeds in this endeavor, but he is unable to eliminate the duality that exists between theoretical and practical reason.

In theoretical reason, the Absolute remains undetermined because it exists beyond the senses; however, theoretical reason confirms its Absolute nature as a necessary concept. This was the very spirit of theology, under which man was to be empowered as a moral being. To establish a relationship between morality and concepts such as God, the soul, and the will, it was necessary to limit the role of epistemological metaphysics. However, it must also be clarified here that in the preface to the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant does not consider concepts like God and immortality to be the conditions of morality. Instead, he regards them as the conditions for the object of the will, which is determined by the moral law. This is the concept of human centrality that forms the foundation of modern critical philosophy. According to this, man alone is responsible for his own actions.